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RESPONSES TO THE COMMENTARIES 




I would like to thank the three eminent scholars for their very thoughtful, and though-provoking, comments on my 
paper (and the seminar presentation which generated it). I will deal with each commentary in turn.




Jean-Yves Rochex explains that he, like me, 
believes that the current dominant conception of 
the ‘social brain’ still embodies an individualistic 
perspective on the nature of human cognition. 
However, unlike me, he is unconvinced that the 
‘social brain’ concept can or should be modiied to 
take account of this failing. I agree when he says that 
“there is in the social brain hypothesis a danger to 
confuse two different topics: the brain’s structure 
and modes of functioning as condition of possibility 
for our social (and cultural) behaviours, and as an 
explication for these behaviours”; and I am also just 
as wary of neuroscientiic reductionism. But I am also 
reluctant to contribute to building strong divisions 
between his (and my) position and those of the less 
reductionist and more open-minded neuroscientists. 
I think the best way forward would be to reach a well-
justiied position which takes account of relevant 
evidence and theory from both the biological and 
social sciences. We do not have to accept that human 
behaviour is entirely shaped by biology to accept that, 
as an organ of human body, the brain has evolved 
to enable forms of learning, communication and 
cooperative problem solving which other mammalian 
brains cannot support. It is the biological nature of 
that brain which allows humans to transcend the 
determinism of instinctive capabilities, and so allow 
children’s cognitive development to be inluenced by 
tensions or contradictions “between the developed 
cultural forms of thinking, acting and feeling in 
which children are involved and the primitive forms 
which characterize their own behavior” (Vygotski, 
1931/2014, as quoted by Rochex). It is for these 
reasons that I think the ‘social brain’ concept deserves 
to be retained. In any case, even if we are not agreed 
on the value of that concept as such, I take great 
reassurance in Rochex’s comment that “I do agree 
with the main theses that Mercer draws from his 
discussion of the social brain hypothesis, namely the 
paramount importance of joint intellectual activity 
and collaboration for human development and for 
the human ability to more than just interact, but 
rather to interthink.”
Moving on to consider Rochex’s discussion 
of classroom dialogue and joint activity, I think 
we are in total accord. I agree entirely that many 
non-linguistic aspects of classroom interaction can 
inluence the quality of collaborative learning, as can 
the speciic tasks set and the artefacts involved, even 
though I have given little attention to them in my 
own discussion. I justify that only on the basis of 
maintaining a focus on the importance of the role 
of language, which I believe is itself often not given 
enough attention.
The next part of Rochex’s commentary is 
concerned with Bernstein and Vygotsky. I am very 
willing to be persuaded of the need to incorporate a 
sociological dimension into a sociocultural account of 
education; and Bernstein is probably the sociologist 
who has given most attention to the relationship 
between language, cognition, culture and education. 
(I had some personal correspondence with Bernstein 
in the  1980s about the normative concept of 
classroom ‘ground rules’ for classroom talk.) As 
Rochex explains, Bernstein’s work certainly brings 
out the heterogeneity of culture, and its potential 
inluence on children’s educational experience, in a 
way that Vygotsky’s does not. Rochex’s own work, 
as summarised in his commentary, elaborates this 
issue well. Moreover, this elaboration makes useful 
connections with the concept of self-regulation, 
which is now being given considerable attention by 
Vygotskian developmental psychologists (Dignath, 
Buettner & Langfeldt, 2008). As Rochex argues, 
the educational implications of this analysis are that 
there is a need to raise both pupils’ and teachers’ 
awareness of aspects of classroom communication 
which normally remain implicit.
In conclusion, Rochex argues for a distinction 
between three relevant meanings of ‘social’, which 
I read as moving from interactional, through 
normative-cultural to societal phenomena. I agree 
completely that the third meaning, or third level, 
is as important for understanding education as the 
other two, and that (despite the inluence of Marxist 
theory) it is left vague in Vygotsky’s work. But 
whether or not that third level is incompatible with 
an improved conception of the social brain, I remain 
unsure.
JEAN-CHARLES CHABANNE
Jean-Charles Chabanne explains that his 
comments are shaped by intention of showing 
how the ideas I have discussed in my article relate 
to French academic traditions (about which I 
shamefully admit do not know as much as I should). 
One of the first researchers he mentions in this 
RESPONSES TO THE COMMENTARIES
Neil Mercer
59
respect is the psychologist Henri Wallon, whose 
work is only familiar to me through his proposal 
that children’s cognitive development is inluenced 
by the dialectic relationship between emotion and 
intelligence. Being inluenced by Marxist ideas about 
the relationship between social/cultural factors and 
individual development, it is perhaps not surprising 
that Wallon, like Vygotsky, gave the acquisition and 
use of language a prominent role in his developmental 
model. As such, I can see that Chabanne is right in 
perceiving compatibility between Wallon’s work and 
the concept of the ‘social brain’ (in its modiied form).
Similarly, Chabanne asks whether links can be 
made with the work of Jerome Bruner. Bruner’s 
conception of the child’s cognitive development, and 
the role of other people in it, is certainly a socio-
cultural formulation. The concept of ‘scaffolding’, 
developed by Bruner, Wood and Ross (1976), is 
certainly closely related to Vygotsky’s concept 
of the Zone of Proximal Development. But, like 
Chabanne, I see no criticism in Bruner’s work of 
the Chomskyan/Pinker conception of language 
as a relatively autonomous component of human 
cognition. Regarding the relationship between Piaget 
and Vygotsky, I was very influenced by hearing 
Bruner (speaking at a conference in Geneva in 1972) 
exhorting us not to dwell too much on the disparities 
between their theories, but instead to celebrate the 
fact that we have from them two wonderful narrative 
accounts of children’s cognitive development to 
guide our own understanding.
Turning to the concept of ‘metacognition’, I agree 
with Chabanne that educational researchers like us 
have a duty to offer teachers clear and practically 
useful explanations of this concept (not least 
because the development of metacognitive and self-
regulatory abilities appears to be linked to academic 
achievement: Dignath, Buettner & Langfeldt, 
2008). Likewise, in his discussion of aspects of 
evolutionary psychology, I agree that we need to 
know more about how, and to what extent, collective 
thinking (interthinking) is a vital inluence on the 
development of individual thinking. Chabanne then 
goes on to make very interesting links between the 
development of ‘theory of mind’ capacity and the 
interpretation of art.
I am indebted to Chabanne for identifying the 
ways that work in the French tradition of language 
sciences has explored the relationship between 
language and thought; and I will certainly reflect 
on his interesting question about the relevance of 
research in cognitive linguistics to the development 
of the social brain hypothesis. Cognitive linguistics 
represents an approach which is very different from 
that of Chomskyan linguistics; some linguists, like 
Evans (2012) even consider the two ‘diametrically 
opposed’. And, as Evans goes on to explain, 
cognitive linguists are committed to providing 
a characterization of language that accords with 
what is known about the mind and brain from 
other disciplines (and not just a model that gives 
priority to the elegance and internal consistency 
of a formal linguistic model). As such, cognitive 
linguistics should be much more open to inluence 
by the interdisciplinary research that I discuss in my 
article than more formalistic, ‘autonomous’ linguistic 
approaches. But although some cognitive linguists 
have espoused a ‘social turn’ in their theorizing 
(Harder, 2009; Sinha, 2009), I am not aware of 
any consideration of how that approach relates to 
Vygotskian, sociocultural approaches to language, 
cognitive development and education.
Regarding the relationship between my discussion 
of the social brain and research in sociological and 
anthropological ields; I agree with Chabanne that 
the interest in knowledge as a collective entity 
and its role in enabling language use shown by 
ethnomethodologists and sociolinguists such as 
Garfinkel and Gee would seem compatible with 
the kind of approach to language and thinking I 
am trying to develop. I have certainly drawn quite 
heavily on those research traditions in developing 
my own methodology for analysing discourse. 
However, I know that some ethnomethodologists and 
discursive psychologists are resistant to the idea that 
we can ever study ‘thinking’ at all, as their empiricist 
philosophy is incompatible with the inference of 
thought processes from behaviour (Edwards, 1997; 
Wooffitt, 2009). But it may be that this does not 
apply to the French researchers such as Bernié and 
Mottiez-Lopez cited by Chabanne. With regard 
to Chabanne’s questions about the relevance of 
sociology of education: I hope my early responses to 
Rochex’s comments about the relevance of the work 
of Bernstein go some way to providing an answer. 
I am still a novice student of the French research 
tradition of sociodidactique, and so I leave it to others 
who are better informed to make connections there.
I have nothing but agreement with Chabanne’s 
discussion of the way our research into classroom 
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language as “talking-to-produce-talking-to-learn” 
should be made useful to teachers. And I thank him 
for drawing my attention to the wealth of relevant 
work in France on language across the curriculum. 
I am currently engaged in an attempt (with others) 
to relate the study of language use and language 
development in school to the ways language is 
used to get things done in other workplaces in 
wider society (see [http://www.hughes.cam.ac.uk/
academic-life/study-centres/oracy/)].
I turn next to Chabanne’s ‘semiotic problemization’ 
of the concept of language. I can only agree that I, 
like many researchers into language in use, tend to 
give little direct attention to non-verbal aspects of 
communication in the classroom, and to the use 
of artifacts in the process of teaching-and-learning. 
My strong expectation is that children’s non-verbal 
sensitivities and skills could be developed through 
activity and discussion guided by a teacher, though 
I do not know of research on such matters. In answer 
to the direct question posed: Yes, I do think those 
multimodal aspects of classroom life (and social life 
generally) should be taken into account in developing 
a more sociocultural conception of the social brain. 
But I think that any one researcher cannot attempt 
to deal with all of that: it should be an enterprise for 
interdisciplinary endeavour and interthinking. And in 
conclusion, I take great reassurance that Chabanne 
agree with me that, for the sake of improving 
education as well as for the development of our 
scientiic understanding, we should try to overcome 
the influence of an inherently individualistic 
conception of human cognition and its development.
ANDRÉE TIBERGHIEN
Andrée Tiberghien offers comments on three 
main themes related to the content of my paper, 
which I paraphrase as (a) the tool of language, 
(b) the shift of research focus from individual to 
collective, and (c) the implications of that shift for 
how we characterize classroom education. And then, 
in conclusion, she offers some queries and comments 
about educational theory.
On the irst theme, Tiberghien makes the nature 
and functions of the specialized language genre of a 
subject like science clearer than I have in my paper. 
As she says, one important way a teacher can help 
students’ learning of physics is help them move from 
using technical language in a merely normative way 
(to conform to the culturally-based expectations 
about how phenomena should be described in a 
science lesson) into a more profoundly different kind 
of functional usage (whereby they use the affordances 
of the language of science to describe phenomena in 
scientiic, rather than everyday, ways).
My discussion of the Vygotskian reciprocal link 
between the intermental and the intramental leads 
her emphasise the importance of recognising the 
relationship between the talk between a teacher 
and students and talk amongst students working 
together. I agree completely with this emphasis. As 
I often say to students of education, the two kinds 
of talk should be considered metaphorically as two 
sides of the same coin. And as Tiberghien says, the 
relationship between them evolves through time; it 
is a socio-historical relationship.
Regarding the shift in research perspective 
from the individual to the collective, Tiberghien 
argues – rightly, in my view – that some concepts 
which are commonly used to characterise learning 
as social – notably ‘communities of practice’ – are 
still inherently individualistic because they focus 
on individual agency and personal identity rather 
than on the evolution of groups or communities as 
collective, knowledge-building entities.
Tiberghien next discusses the theoretical 
implications this shift in perspective for how we 
characterise classrooms, relating it irst to my early 
work with Derek Edwards. She then her draws upon 
own more recent work and that of Sensevy on joint 
actions in didactics, which in turn draws on the 
Wittgensteinian notion of a language game. As she 
puts it “characterising the rules of the game and their 
origin is a way to study the social structure of the 
classroom.” This relates to the notion of ‘educational 
ground rules’ Edwards and I employed to describe the 
implicit, normative basis of classroom life; and which 
(as I mentioned in response to Rochex) was also used 
in a similar way by Bernstein. If I have understood 
matters correctly, Tiberghien suggests that one 
potentially problematic feature of the common 
knowledge which teachers and students must share 
if the educational process is to be successful are 
the conditions of the ‘didactic contract’ which both 
take for granted when they engage in classroom 
interactions. For example, a student and a teacher 
may have different conceptions of the terms of this 
contract and also of the ground rules involved in 
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putting it into action. Research which took account of 
these potentially different interpretations could help 
to relate, and reconcile, perspectives on education as 
both an individual and collective enterprise. I agree 
that it could be particularly useful if such research 
include a temporal dimension, in which classroom 
life was studied at different scales of time.
CONCLUSION
Overall, then, I am very grateful to all three 
researchers for taking my ideas seriously, and 
providing such thoughtful commentaries. I hope 
we – and our readers – can see our collection of 
texts as a productive example of the very process 
of interthinking with which we are concerned: we 
have engaged in critical, supportive, collaborative, 
exploratory discussion in the pursuit of the common 
goal of understanding the communicative process of 
classroom education.
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